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ABSTRACT
The emergence of indigenous peoples’ rights represents one of the most 
significant developments in the recent history of international human rights. 
The difficult and complex process that ultimately led to the recognition of 
these rights in international law has demonstrated that global and regional 
systems can increasingly interplay in the context of human rights develop-
ment. By considering the parallel normative and political developments 
that have taken place at the global and regional levels, this article submits 
that the Inter-American, African, and European human rights systems made 
important contributions to the construction and consolidation of the global 
regime of indigenous rights.
*  Mauro Barelli is a lecturer at The City Law School (London) where he teaches Public Inter-
national Law and UK Constitutional and Administrative Law. He completed his LL.B. at the 
University of Milan-Bicocca in 2003 and was awarded an LL.M. in Public International Law 
from the University of Bristol in 2005. Barelli’s research focuses on diverse aspects of Public 
International Law and International Human Rights, especially in relation to minority groups. 
He is currently completing his Ph.D. at Cardiff University examining the accommodation of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in international law. 
    The author would like to thank Dr. Urfan Khaliq and Dr. Gaetano Pentassuglia for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Current international lawmaking is a complex and dynamic process in which 
a variety of actors participate and instruments of diverse nature are involved.1 
The growing need for coordinated action in response to global challenges 
has determined a significant expansion of the role played by supranational 
institutions, of both global and regional scope. Similarly, representatives 
of civil society, especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have 
regularly been allowed to participate in the formation of certain areas of 
international law. On a different level, soft law has become an important 
and valuable alternative to hard law, as confirmed by the significant increase 
in the use of non-legally binding instruments.2
These innovations have become especially visible in the area of inter-
national human rights, where the recently emerged regime of indigenous 
peoples’ rights aptly confirms this trend. Established as a result of the interac-
tion between states, supranational institutions, and civil society, this regime 
derives its legal significance precisely from the interplay between hard and 
soft law. Among other things, the multi-faceted process that ultimately led 
to the establishment of a universal and comprehensive regime of indigenous 
rights has demonstrated the increasingly crucial role that regional systems 
can play in the construction and consolidation of global human rights re-
gimes. Whereas it is normally recognized that regional human rights systems 
importantly contribute to promote and protect universal human rights,3 
less attention is paid to their potential contribution with regard to the two 
abovementioned processes. Considering the current “diversified forms and 
levels of [international] law-making,”4 this sort of contribution should be 
increasingly looked at. 
  1. See, e.g., ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Christine 
Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLICANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21 (Dinah 
Shelton ed., 2000); Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Changing Constitution 
of International Society, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Michael Byers ed., 2001).
  2. Contrary to hard law instruments, soft law instruments are not legally binding. The 
category of soft law includes, among others, interstate conference declarations, UN 
General Assembly resolutions, codes of conduct, guidelines, and the recommendations 
of international organizations. Crucially, various soft law instruments will have different 
legal significance, as well as different degree of effectiveness. On soft law generally, 
see Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989). 
  3. See RHONA K.M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 80–82 (3d ed. 2007); HENRY STEINER & 
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW POLITICS MORALS 779–85 (2d ed. 
2008).
  4. Chinkin, Normative Development, supra note 1, at 22.
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This article submits that the Inter-American, African, and European hu-
man rights systems have contributed to the emergence of the global regime 
of indigenous peoples’ rights in two main respects. First, they supported and, 
in turn, strengthened the global political process aimed towards the recogni-
tion of these rights. Second, they have contributed significantly to the legal 
process of clarification and interpretation of some of the most controversial 
provisions of the regime. Section II of this article will describe the main 
stages of the emergence of indigenous peoples’ rights in international law. 
Following that, Sections III and IV will discuss the political and normative 
developments that have taken place within the Inter-American, African, and 
European systems in the sphere of indigenous peoples’ rights. These latter 
sections will highlight the important implications that these developments 
have had for the definitive affirmation of the indigenous rights regime at 
the global level. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: AN 
OVERVIEW
The interaction between international and regional institutions in the con-
text of indigenous peoples’ rights must be discussed in conjunction with an 
analysis of the evolution of indigenous rights in international law. Whereas 
it took more than two decades for the claims of indigenous peoples to be 
addressed seriously within the UN framework, the UN human rights ma-
chinery has increasingly and intensively focused on the issue, ultimately 
creating a sui generis regime of indigenous rights.5 The following analysis 
identifies and describes the three key stages of the global political process 
that led to the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights: first, the opening 
up of the UN system to the claims of indigenous peoples; second, the broad 
identification of the normative framework related to indigenous rights; and 
third, the specification of the actual content of the regime and its final af-
firmation on a global scale.
The first significant event within the United Nations took place in the 
early 1970s, when the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission) appointed Special Rapporteur 
José Martínez Cobo to undertake a comprehensive study on the situation 
  5. See Elsa Stamatopoulou, Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as 
a Developing Dynamic, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 58 (1994); Asbjørn Eide, Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Achievement in International Law During the Last Quarter of a Century, 37 
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 155 (2006).
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of indigenous peoples.6 This initiative marked a watershed moment in the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and international law in that for 
the first time since its establishment the UN resolved to address the “indig-
enous question,” reversing a tradition of injustice and discrimination against 
indigenous peoples. The following establishment, in 1982, of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), notably a subsidiary body of 
the Sub-Commission, represented the first visible sign of the new era.7 The 
WGIP was composed of five independent experts whose mandate was to 
“review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations,”8 giv-
ing special attention to the evolution of standards concerning those rights. 
Shortly after its establishment, unique arrangements were made to allow 
indigenous organizations without consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) to participate in the WGIP sessions, a circum-
stance that represents a distinctive feature of the drafting history of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).9 Importantly, 
the WGIP successfully pushed indigenous issues onto the UN human rights 
agenda, laying the groundwork for future crucial developments. With the 
establishment of the WGIP, indigenous peoples not only entered the inter-
national arena, but also came to be recognized as a distinguished category 
within international law.
The second stage of the recognition process consisted of the broad 
identification of the normative framework within which indigenous rights 
would develop. Two events characterized this intense period of development: 
the WGIP’s initiative of drafting a declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples,10 and the International Labour Organization (ILO) decision to pro-
duce a new, modern instrument for the protection of indigenous peoples’ 
rights, repudiating the depreciable, assimilative approach that guided its 
previous action in this field.11 As a result, in 1989 the organization adopted 
  6. Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Volume V 
Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, by Jose’ R. Martinez Cobo, Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, United Nations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4. http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/unpfii/en/spdaip.html
  7. Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, adopted 7 May 
1982, ECOSOC Res. 1982/34, U.N. ESCOR, at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82 (1982).
  8. Id.
  9. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted 13 Sept. 2007, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
 10. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Resolution 
1985/22, adopted 29 Aug. 1985, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n 
on Prev. of Discrim. & Protect. of Min., 38th Sess.
 11. The first ILO instrument dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights was the Convention 
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries (ILO No. 107), adopted 26 June 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 
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ILO Convention No. 169,12 which remains the only internationally binding 
instrument specifically designed to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.13 
A few years later, in 1993, the WGIP completed its draft declaration and sent 
it to the Sub-Commission for approval.14 By that time, the ILO Convention 
No. 169 and the UN draft declaration had largely defined the normative 
framework of indigenous rights. This framework was increasingly supported 
by the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) and Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), each of which made 
important contributions to the elaboration of international legal standards 
applicable to indigenous peoples.15
Nevertheless, while the normative content of the indigenous rights regime 
had been broadly defined, the creation of an effective regime was far from 
complete. On the one hand, the poor ratification record had inevitably un-
dermined the global impact of ILO No. 169.16 Further shortcomings derived 
from the convention’s failure to recognize indigenous peoples as “peoples” 
proper,17 to confer on them the right to self-determination, and to address 
   247 (entered into force 2 June 1959) [hereinafter ILO No. 107]. On the assimilationist 
character of ILO No. 107, see S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-
56 (2d ed. 2004). The official decision to revise ILO No. 107 was taken in September 
1986 during the Meeting of Experts on the Revision of Convention No. 107. See LUIS 
RODRÍGUES-PIÑERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME 
(1919–1989), at 284 (2005). 
 12. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 
No. 169), adopted 27 June 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force 5 Sept. 1991) 
[hereinafter ILO No. 169].
 13. ILO No. 107 is no longer open to ratification but remains valid for those states that, 
having previously ratified it, decided not to become parties to ILO No. 169.
 14. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, As Agreed upon by Members 
of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations at its Eleventh Session, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prev. of Discrim. & Protect. of Min., 45th Sess., 
at 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993).
 15. The HRC did so by promoting a progressive interpretation of the right to culture included 
in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In particular, 
it recognized that “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way 
of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous 
peoples.” General Comment No. 23 (art. 27), adopted 6 Apr. 1994, U.N. GAOR, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., 1314th mtg., ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994). 
CERD, instead, focused more prominently on the issue of land rights, regularly request-
ing that States Parties “recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, 
develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources.” General 
Recommendation XXIII on Indigenous Peoples, adopted 18 Aug. 1997, U.N. GAOR, 
Comm. on Elim. of Racial Discrim., 51st Sess., at 122, U.N. Doc A/52/18 (1998).
 16. ILO No. 169, supra note 12, has been ratified by twenty states as of July 2010, leaving 
the majority of indigenous peoples unable to rely on its legal framework.
 17. Id. art. 1(3), specifies that “the use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be 
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term 
under international law.”
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contemporary issues such as indigenous intellectual property rights.18 On 
the other hand, despite their important role in promoting indigenous rights 
at the international level, the HRC and CERD could only partially address 
the full range of claims legitimately advanced by indigenous peoples. In ad-
dition, the issue of coherence became increasingly relevant. The growth of 
international bodies dealing either specifically or incidentally with indigenous 
rights highlighted the need for coordinated action in the field. Against this 
background, the necessity to produce a universal and comprehensive instru-
ment designed to protect and promote the rights of all the world’s indigenous 
peoples became plainly manifest. Such an instrument was also necessary 
in order to harmonize the actions of the growing number of international 
organizations dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights. As became clear that 
the then UN draft declaration could achieve all of the abovementioned goals, 
increasing attention converged on this document.
Accordingly, the third and crucial stage of the process aimed for the 
adoption of a UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As 
noted above, the first draft of the document was completed by the WGIP 
in 1993. A year later it was adopted by the Sub-Commission and sent to 
the Commission on Human Rights.19 The fundamental point to stress here is 
that the draft declaration was essentially a product of indigenous peoples’ 
representatives and the five experts of the WGIP. As aptly observed by 
Robert Tickner, then the Australian Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, most 
states did not actively participate in the sessions of the WGIP because they 
had “reserved their position for UN forums further up the hierarchy, where 
indigenous voices were not expected to be heard with such strength and 
determination and where governments had in the past dictated the agenda 
free of non-governmental . . . interference.”20 
Accordingly, when the draft declaration did reach the Commission on 
Human Rights, several states expressed their concerns about its radical con-
tent. In particular, it should be emphasized that the inclusion in the text of 
critical rights such as the right to self-determination and to collectively own 
ancestral lands seriously challenged the principle of state sovereignty, and 
potentially conflicted with the pursuit of states’ primary interests. Equally 
important, the insistence on the collective dimension of indigenous rights 
clashed with the Western individualistic conception of human rights that has 
 18. See generally Mpazi Sinjela & Robin Ramcharan, Protecting Traditional Knowledge and 
Traditional Medicine of Indigenous Peoples through Intellectual Property Rights: Issues, 
Challenges and Strategies, 12 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1 (2005).
 19. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted 26 Aug. 
1994, Sub-Commission Res. 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n 
on Prev. of Discrim. & Protect. of Min., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2 (1994). 
 20. ROBERT TICKNER, TAKING A STAND: LAND RIGHTS TO RECONCILIATION 303 (2001).
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come to dominate the current human rights system. Given these premises, 
the Commission on Human Rights decided to set up a subsidiary organ, 
the Working Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD), for the sole purpose 
of further elaboration of the text of the draft declaration.21 Not surprisingly 
considering the conflicting opinions, this body took more than ten years 
before agreeing on a final text of the draft and submitting it to the newly 
created Human Rights Council. After the adoption by the Human Rights 
Council during its first session in June 2006,22 the text reached the General 
Assembly, where it was ultimately adopted in September 2007.23 Despite 
being a soft law document, and thus lacking legally-binding force, the 
UNDRIP has become the key instrument of the indigenous rights regime, 
confirming the crucial interplay between hard and soft law in the context 
of indigenous peoples’ rights.24 
In order to better appreciate the importance of the regional initiatives 
discussed in the second part of the article, the following sections will briefly 
consider some of the most controversial issues that emerged throughout the 
discussions at the United Nations. 
A. The Issue of Definition
The sessions of both the WGIP and WGDD were characterized by fervent 
discussions in relation to the issue of definition.25 On the one hand, states’ 
 21. The working group was established in 1995 in accordance with Commission on Hu-
man Rights Resolution 1995/32 and Economic and Social Council Resolution 1995/32. 
Establishment of a Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights To Elaborate 
a Draft Declaration in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 
49/214 of 23 December 1994, adopted 3 Mar. 1995, C.H.R. Res. 1995/32, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., at 19, U.N. Doc. E/1995/23 (1995); Establishment of 
a Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights To Elaborate a Draft Declaration 
in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 49/214, adopted 25 
July 1995, ECOSOC Res. 1995/32, U.N. ESCOR, 1995 Substantive Sess., at 44, U.N. 
Doc. E/1995/95 (1996). It should be emphasized that indigenous organizations were 
allowed to participate in the sessions of the WGDD regardless of their consultative status 
with the Economic and Social Council, thus confirming the decision taken with regard 
to the WGIP.
 22. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted 29 June 2006, H.R.C. 
Res. 2006/2, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/2 (2006).
 23. UNDRIP, supra note 9.
 24. Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
957 (2009).
 25. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Second Session, 
U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prev. of Discrim. & Protect. of 
Min., 36th Sess., ¶¶ 109–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22 (1983); Report of the 
Working Group on the Draft Declaration, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 52d 
Sess., ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84 (1996).
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and indigenous peoples’ representatives disagreed as to the eventuality of 
including a definition of “indigenous peoples” in the text of the declaration. 
In this regard, whereas indigenous peoples consistently objected to any such 
attempt,26 several states emphasized the necessity of creating and including 
a definition in the document.27 On the other hand, important uncertain-
ties surrounded the very concept of “indigenous peoples.” In particular, 
a number of Asian and African states adamantly stressed that the concept 
of indigenous peoples did not apply to their regions. While several Asian 
governmental representatives expressed such a view openly,28 the position of 
African states could be inferred from two main elements. First, their limited 
participation to the sessions of the two working groups suggested per se a 
certain disengagement with the issue.29 Second, and more evidently, a 2006 
Resolution of the African Union (AU) Assembly of Head of State and Govern-
ment, while welcoming the decision of the UN General Assembly to defer 
the adoption of the UNDRIP, noted that the vast majority of the peoples of 
Africa are indigenous to the African continent, advancing important reserva-
tions with regard to the concept’s applicability to the region.30 Obviously, 
the emergence of an agreed and inclusive understanding of the concept of 
indigenous peoples was necessary for the construction of a truly universal 
 26. Working Paper on the Concept of “Indigenous People,” by Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, 
U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prev. of Discrim. & Protect. of 
Min., Working Grp. on Indigeous Populations, 14th Sess., ¶¶ 35–38, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (1996).
 27. According to Kingsbury, these states employed a positivist approach to the issue, namely 
one that:
treats “indigenous peoples” as a legal category requiring precise definition, so that for particular 
operational purposes it should be possible to determine, on the basis of that definition, exactly 
who does or does not have a particular status, enjoy a particular right, or assume a particular 
responsibility.
   Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach 
to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1998).
 28. For example, India contended that the tribes living in its territory could not be regarded as 
indigenous given that, among other things, it was not possible to establish whether they 
actually came before other neighboring communities. Similarly, Bangladesh maintained 
that: 
the definition of indigenous peoples should be viewed within the framework of the historical 
experience of countries in the Western Hemisphere and in Australasia where a colonizing racially 
distinct people from oversees established settlements and entered into a situation of conflict with 
the autochthonous population of those countries.
   Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Second Session, supra 
note 25, ¶¶ 112, 115.
 29. Representatives of African indigenous peoples have on more than one occasion expressed 
their regret at the limited participation of African States. See, e.g., Report of the Working 
Group on the Draft Declaration, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 57th Sess., ¶ 
20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85 (2001).
 30. Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.141 (VII), 8th Sess., Jan. 2007, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm.
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regime. It was against this background, as will be discussed below, that the 
pronouncements of two key regional players—the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR)—importantly contributed to disentangle the 
concept of indigenous peoples from ideas of colonial subjugation and priority 
in time with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory.
B. The Right to Self-determination
Turning to the second issue, it should be noted that the UNDRIP is the first 
international human rights instrument to expressly recognize the right to 
self-determination to a sub-state group. Understandably, states expressed a 
certain discomfort with having such a far-reaching provision included in the 
document. In particular, several states fully objected to the recognition of 
an unqualified right to self-determination to indigenous peoples, fearing that 
their sovereignty and territorial integrity would be seriously undermined.31 In 
contrast, indigenous peoples repeatedly stressed that they would not accept 
any limitation to their right to self-determination, as this would constitute 
a violation of one of the central principles of the UNDRIP—the principle 
of equality of peoples. A solution could only be achieved by emphasizing 
the internal aspect of the right to self-determination, and ruling out the 
possibility that indigenous self-determination would include, absent special 
circumstances, a right to secession. Although a number of states were ready 
to accept such a compromise, others continued to oppose it, considering it 
an unduly and even potentially harmful concession. As will be discussed in 
Section IV, the disagreement as to the meaning of indigenous self-determina-
tion was to characterize the global debate on indigenous rights, and nearly 
prevented the adoption of the UNDRIP. In light of these concerns, it was 
crucial that all the parties involved in the discussion come to an agreement 
on the meaning and implications of this right.
C. Land Rights
Land rights represented another controversial issue in relation to the emerg-
ing indigenous rights regime. Throughout the drafting process, indigenous 
peoples maintained that control of their lands was vital for the exercise 
of their right to self-determination as well as their very survival. States, on 
 31. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration, supra note 25, ¶ 
47. 
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their part, were concerned by the potential implications stemming from too 
extensive a recognition of such rights. In their view, the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their traditional lands could only be recognized if “the need 
for Governments to own or regulate resources in the interests of all their 
citizens”32 was also acknowledged. Further concerns arose with regard to 
Article 28 of the UNDRIP establishing a right to restitution or compensation 
for traditional lands taken from indigenous peoples without their free, prior, 
and informed consent. States anticipated that this provision would result 
in an uncontrollable escalation of conflicts between indigenous peoples 
and third parties that currently owned or occupied the disputed lands.33 A 
system so designed, they argued, would simply be unworkable. Given such 
premises, it comes as no surprise that the divergences on land rights came 
to represent another important obstacle on the road towards the adoption 
of the UNDRIP and threatened to undermine its future effectiveness.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GLOBAL POLITICAL PROCESS
As noted in Section I, it is normally recognized that regional human rights 
systems importantly contribute to promote and protect universal human 
rights. As is evident in the case of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights,34 regional human rights systems may establish regional human rights 
instruments which—despite deriving from and operating within the framework 
of universal human rights—manage to take into account the cultural and po-
litical traditions of the concerned region, offering a tailored and constructive 
response to the human rights problems arising within their geographical area 
of activity. As a consequence, regional systems tend to be seen as genuine 
representatives of the region’s values and, therefore, may be rewarded with 
a higher degree of trust by constituent states and peoples.
Without denying the importance of the abovementioned circumstance, 
regional systems’ capacity to contribute to the very construction and con-
solidation of global human rights regimes should also be acknowledged. 
In the case of indigenous peoples’ rights, for example, it is undoubted that 
 32. Report of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. 
Rts., 56th Sess., ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84 (1999).
 33. For example, Australia noted that the land rights regime envisaged in the document 
was “arbitrary and impossible to implement,” and, furthermore, that it did not take 
into account the fact that “ownership of land might lawfully vest in others.” General 
Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Major Step Forward” 
Towards Human Rights for All, Says President (7 Sept. 2007), available at http://www.
un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.
 34. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986).
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regional systems will play an important role in promoting and protecting 
the concerned rights.35 Nevertheless, the value of certain earlier actions 
should also be discussed and appreciated. In particular, regional systems 
both strengthened the global political process of recognition of indigenous 
rights and contributed to the legal process of clarification and interpretation 
of the relative normative content. The following sections will consider the 
former kind of contribution, whereas Section IV will deal with the latter. 
As noted in Section II, the global political process of recognition of 
indigenous rights began to take shape in the early 1980s. As discussed 
above, this process gained momentum in the late 1990s, when international 
efforts converged to produce a universal instrument for the protection of 
indigenous rights. At the same time, however, important differences with 
regard to the scope and content of the relevant legal regime emerged both 
between states and indigenous peoples and among states themselves. Such 
contrasts were so serious that doubts were cast on more than one occasion 
as to whether this global project would ever reach a positive conclusion. It 
is precisely this uncertainty that the gradual engagement of regional human 
rights systems with indigenous rights should be considered. By promptly 
responding to the political and normative developments occurring at the 
international level, regional systems sent an important message to both states 
and the other international actors involved in this global process, namely 
that parallel processes of recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights were 
taking place in various parts of the world. By doing so, they were able to 
exert significant influence on both discussions between governments’ and 
indigenous peoples’ representatives and the agenda of those international 
players dealing with indigenous issues. The crucial point here is that the 
regional initiatives occurred before the global project of recognition of 
indigenous rights came to a successful conclusion. Thus, it would be rather 
difficult to argue that the regional initiatives (which will be discussed below) 
had no significant effect on the course of the ongoing debates. As will be 
demonstrated, the Organization of American States (OAS) was not only the 
first system to intervene, but also the one that most successfully promoted 
a regional system for the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. This said, 
the contributions of African and European bodies were also important and 
should be recognized.
 35. For example, it should be noted that the UNDRIP recognizes that “the situation of in-
digenous peoples varies from region to region and from country to country and that the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical and cultural 
backgrounds should be taken into consideration.” UNDRIP, supra note 9, pmbl., ¶ 
23.
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A. The Inter-American System
Of the regional systems, the OAS has historically been at the forefront in 
the protection of indigenous rights. In fact, the existence of an “indigenous 
question” was acknowledged by the Inter-American system at its very estab-
lishment in 1948,36 whereas resolutions dealing specifically with indigenous 
peoples have been issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Inter-American Commission) since the early 1970s.37 
However, a systematic approach to indigenous rights was not devel-
oped until the late 1980s. Inspired by the developments occurring at the 
global level, the Inter-American Commission increasingly began to address 
indigenous peoples’ rights in a more comprehensive manner. Its 1985 de-
cision on the Yanomami case38 was the first sign of a forthcoming change. 
Although the Inter-American Commission did not go as far as recognizing 
specific rights attributable to indigenous peoples, it created the basis for 
further developments by highlighting that Brazil’s failure to take timely and 
effective measures on behalf of the Yanomami Indians ultimately led to the 
violation of, inter alia, their rights to life, liberty, and personal security. This 
important decision was followed by another historic recognition, namely 
that the legal framework in force at the time was inadequate to address 
the “special and unique problems faced by the aboriginal populations of 
the Americas in the area of human rights.”39 As a result of this, in 1989 the 
Inter-American Commission was entrusted by the OAS General Assembly 
with the task of preparing “a juridical instrument relative to the rights of 
 36. For example, Article 39 of the 1948 Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees provides 
that: 
In those countries where the problem of native population exists, the necessary measures shall 
be taken to provide the Indian protection and assistance, protecting his life, liberty, and property, 
and defending him from extermination, and safeguarding him from oppression and exploitation, 
protecting him from poverty, and providing adequate education.
   In a less paternalistic way, the same article goes on requesting that specific institutions 
should be created “to ensure respect for their lands, to legalize their possession by them, 
and to prevent the invasion of such lands by outsiders.” Inter-American Charter of Social 
Guarantees, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Final 
Act, Resolution XXXIX, 29 (1948).
 37. For example, a 1972 resolution affirmed that “special protection for indigenous popu-
lations constitutes a scared commitment of the [American] states.” Resolution Entitled 
Special Protection for Indigenous Populations, Action to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, adopted 14 Mar. 1973, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P.A.G/doc.305/72, rev.1.
 38. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 12/85 (5 Mar. 1985), 
Case No. 7615.
 39. Preparatory Documents for the Draft American Declaration of the Indigenous Peoples, 
Justification and Recommendation to the General Assembly of the OAS on the Preparation 
of an Inter-American Instrument on This Matter (Mar. 1989). Included in Situation of the 
Human Rights of Indigenous Persons and Peoples in the American, Inter-Am Comm’n 
on Hum. Rts., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108 Doc. 62 (20 Oct. 2000). 
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the Indian peoples.”40 This step followed by only a few years the decision 
of the UN WGIP to draft a universal declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples. Interestingly, parallel developments at the United Nations and OAS 
continued in the following years, demonstrating an important symbiosis 
between the regional and global dimensions. In 1990 the Inter-American 
Commission created the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.41 A decade later, a similar initiative was taken by the 
UN Commission of Human Rights, which appointed a UN Special Rap-
portuer on the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of Indigenous People.42 
More importantly, in 1997 the Inter-American Commission would vote and 
approve the text of the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.43 As discussed in Section II, a few years earlier in 1994, 
the WGIP had adopted the text of the UN draft declaration. Finally, follow-
ing the example set by the UN Commission on Human Rights, which in 
1995 had created the WGDD to further discuss the content of the UN draft 
declaration, the OAS General Assembly established a Permanent Council 
Working Group in 1999 for the purpose of continuing the consideration of 
the text of the Proposed American Declaration.44
In light of the above, it is clear that while developing a regional system 
for the protection of indigenous rights, the OAS was inspired by and, in 
turn, inspired the simultaneous process taking place at the global level. 
From a global perspective, the historic significance of the indigenous ques-
tion in the region made all the above-mentioned developments even more 
valuable.45 As will be discussed later, the OAS engagement with indigenous 
rights would become even more significant when the Inter American Court 
of Human Rights began to directly address the issue of indigenous peoples’ 
land rights. 
 40. OAS General Assembly Resolution No. 1022/89, adopted 18 Nov. 1989.
 41. See Presentation by Dr. Julio Prado Vallejo, Special Rapporteur of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in the process of Preparing the Draft Declaration, O.A.S. 
Doc. OEA/Ser.K/XVIGT/DADIN/doc.103/02 (13 Nov. 2002).
 42. Human Rights and Indigenous Issues, adopted 24 Apr. 2001, C.H.R. Res. 2001/57, U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 57th Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57 
(2001).
 43. As of today, the only version of the instrument voted on by the Inter-American Commis-
sion is the 1997 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
approved 26 Feb. 1997, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 95th Regular Sess., O.A.S. 
Doc. OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95, Doc.6.
 44. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, adopted 7 
June 1999, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P, AG/RES. 1610 (XXIX-O/99).
 45. See, e.g., BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIES (2004).
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B. The African System
The African and European human rights systems responded to the changes 
occurring at the global level at a later stage than did the OAS. Nevertheless, 
they provided important contributions to the developing process. The African 
delay is partially explained by the region’s late engagement with human rights 
in general. Indeed, human rights became an integral part of the regional legal 
framework only in 1981 with the adoption of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. However, historic and sociopolitical circumstances also 
importantly account for the late action with respect to indigenous peoples’ 
rights. As explained by Frans Viljoen, African post-colonial states had the 
tendency to associate nation-building with the identification of one privileged 
ethnic group, with the consequence that several other groups ended up in 
a vulnerable and marginalized position.46 It follows that initiatives that aim 
to recognize significant rights for selected groups might have destabilizing 
effects on the larger society.47 
Against this background, it is even more remarkable that an important 
process of recognition and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights has actu-
ally taken place in the region. The first sign of a new approach appeared only 
a decade or so ago, when the global process of recognition of indigenous 
rights had entered the third and crucial stage of its evolution. Despite the 
delayed action, the mechanism progressed speedily and significantly. The 
gradual involvement of the African human rights system with indigenous 
issues was certainly inspired by the developments taking place at the global 
level,48 yet Africa’s involvement in turn would importantly contribute to the 
realization of the global project for the recognition of indigenous rights. 
In particular, the opening up of the region to indigenous rights had vital 
implications for the affirmation of the universal character of the indigenous 
rights regime.
The turning point in the region was the decision of the African Com-
mission in 2000 to establish the Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions/Communities in Africa (WGIPC).49 The initial mandate of the WGIPC 
 46. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 280 (2007).
 47. Indeed, as Viljoen put it, the African traditional denial of the existence of indigenous 
peoples derives from the fear that this “will expose the fragility of the artifice of the 
African nation state.” Id. at 279.
 48. It has been aptly observed that the gradual involvement of African human rights institu-
tions in indigenous issues was “largely a regional manifestation of the developments 
taking place at [sic] international law.” Kealeboga N. Bojosi & George Mukundi Wachira, 
Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis of the Approach of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 6 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 382, 382 (2006).
 49. Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ Communities in Africa, adopted 6 Nov. 
2000, ACHPR/Res. 51(XXVIII)00, available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/
documentation.html?../resolutions/resolution56_en.html.
2010 Indigenous Rights Regime: Global and Regional Systems 965
was not particularly ambitious, as the body was tasked only to conduct a 
preliminary investigation on the issue of indigenous peoples’ rights in the 
African region.50 Yet the study had critical implications for the African ap-
proach to the “indigenous question.” With this historic step, the African 
Commission had opened the door to further important developments, which 
did not take very long indeed to manifest. Since 2001, representatives of 
indigenous peoples/communities have attended the sessions of the African 
Commission testifying on their desperate situations and the human rights 
violations to which they are victim.51 Contextually, the African Commission 
has begun to regularly question states’ representatives on the situation of 
the indigenous peoples living within their territory, paying increasing at-
tention to the issue of indigenous rights in its Concluding Observations on 
state reports.52 Another important sign of the change affecting the African 
approach to indigenous rights is the increasingly significant role assigned to 
the WGIPC. As noted above, this body was initially entrusted with the task 
of conducting a preliminary investigation on the applicability of the concept 
of indigenous rights in the region. As a result of its findings, however, the 
mandate of the body was reformulated and renewed.53 The functions of the 
 50. The WGIPC had to carry out three distinctive investigations: first, examining the concept 
of indigenous populations/communities in Africa; second, studying the implications 
of the African Charter on the well being of indigenous populations/communities; and 
third, considering appropriate recommendations for the monitoring and protection of 
the rights of indigenous populations/communities in the region. Id.
 51. REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS/COM-
MUNITIES 8 (2005), available at http://www.iwgia.org/sw2186.asp.
 52. In 2005, for example, commenting on the state report produced by Cameroon, the African 
Commission expressed its concern with regard to the situation “of vulnerable groups in 
general, [and] in particular that of street children, of indigenous populations/communi-
ties and human rights defenders.” Concluding Observations on the Periodic Report of 
Cameroon, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., 39th Ordinary Sess., 2005, ¶ 14. On 
another occasion, it took note of the positive steps taken by South Africa with regard to 
the recognition of the rights of indigenous populations. Concluding Observations and 
Recommendations on the First Periodic Report of the Republic of South Africa, 38th 
Ordinary Sess., 2005, ¶ 34. Finally, while commenting on the state report prepared by 
Uganda in 2006, the African Commission expressed its concern with “the exploitation, 
the discrimination and the marginalization of indigenous populations.” Accordingly, it 
recommended that Uganda “ensure that the rights of indigenous people and socially 
disadvantaged are respected.” Concluding Observation on the Second Periodic Report 
of the Republic of Uganda, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., 40th Ordinary Sess., 
2006, ¶¶ 23, 34. See International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, available at 
http://www.iwgia.org/sw25311.asp.
 53. The first mandate following the adoption of the report was included in: Resolution on 
the Adoption of the “Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities,” adopted 20 Nov. 2003, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ 
Rts., 34th Ordinary Sess. Later, the mandate was renewed on two occasions: in 2005 
and 2007. All the pertinent resolutions can be found at International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs, Resolutions & Official Documents, available at http://www.iwgia.
org/sw8774.asp.
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WGIPC now include: gathering information and communications on viola-
tions of indigenous populations’ human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
undertaking country visits to study the human rights situation of indigenous 
populations/communities, and formulating recommendations and proposals 
on appropriate measures and activities to prevent and remedy violations 
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations/
communities. Another important development is that the WGIPC is now 
requested to “Co-operate when relevant and feasible with other international 
and regional human rights mechanisms, institutions and organizations.”54 In 
addition, factual evidence shows that the body has been rather active after 
being invested with a wider mandate. Apart from conducting a number of 
country visits and missions,55 it has met and cooperated with several UN 
bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights and Freedoms of Indigenous People. The WGIPC 
has also launched a common project with the ILO on the “Promotion of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights through the implementation of the principles of 
ILO Convention No. 169 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.”56
The emergence of a genuine political willingness to develop a compre-
hensive approach to indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa has had important 
consequences on the global level. The openness of a region traditionally 
hostile to minority rights discourses in general provided important support 
to the ongoing global efforts to establish a universal regime of indigenous 
rights. The African Commission’s commitment to the indigenous cause is not 
expected to wane in the coming years, either. Indeed, after the adoption of the 
UNDRIP by the UN General Assembly, the African Commission welcomed 
the instrument, confidant that it would “become a very valuable tool and a 
point of reference for its efforts to ensure the promotion and protection of 
indigenous rights in the African continent.”57 
 54. Id.
 55. For instance, it conducted several “research and information country visits,” notably in 
Burundi, Libya, and the Republic of Congo in 2005, the Central African Republic and 
Uganda in 2006, and the Republic of Gabon in 2007. See the various Progress Reports 
for the ACHPR Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, available at 
http://www.iwgia.org/sw2073.asp.
 56. Progress Report for the ACHPR Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, 
Inter-sessional period between the 39th and 40th ordinary sessions of the ACHPR.
 57. Resolution on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
adopted 28 Nov. 2007, ACHPR/Res.121 (XXXXII)07, available at http://www.achpr.org/
english/resolutions/resolution121_en.htm.
2010 Indigenous Rights Regime: Global and Regional Systems 967
C. The European System
The Inter-American and African regions share two crucial characteristics 
with respect to the “indigenous question:” first, they both have a large 
number of indigenous peoples living in their territories,58 and, second, they 
both lacked a system of protection of minority rights that could be relied 
on by indigenous peoples before the establishment of specific mechanisms 
aimed to recognize and protect their rights. The European region, in con-
trast, significantly differs in these two respects. First, a far smaller number of 
indigenous peoples live in the region. The best known of these groups are 
the Inuit of Greenland and the Sámi, whose living areas are spread across 
parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia’s Kola Peninsula.59 The second 
difference is that there has been an international treaty aimed to protect the 
rights of national minorities in the region since 1995: the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). 
These two circumstances discouraged the creation of regional mechanisms 
or bodies designed specifically to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. 
However, as we shall see, this did not prevent a number of European bodies 
from following the international normative trend towards the recognition of 
indigenous rights and, in turn, contributing to its final consolidation.
First, the case of the Framework Convention on the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities should be considered. The FCNM is designed to protect 
the rights of national minorities living within the territory of state parties. 
Accordingly, explicit references to indigenous peoples are found nowhere in 
its text. However, since minority and indigenous rights belong to the same 
broad legal area, a number of principles and provisions apply indistinctively 
to both sub-state groups.60 Indeed, the Advisory Committee, the indepen-
dent expert committee responsible for evaluating the implementation of the 
FCNM,61 has repeatedly stressed that “recognizing a group of persons as an 
 58. See INTERNATIONAL WORKGROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS (IGWA), THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 2008 
(2008).
 59. One should also mention the small number of indigenous populations of Russia and 
other groups living in Eastern Europe such as the Tartars of Ukraine, who might be 
recognized as indigenous in the near future. In this regard, it should be noted that 
some authors have argued that “perhaps it is time that ‘Europe’ elaborated a treaty on 
indigenous rights: especially in view of the considerable enlargement of the number of 
indigenous and ‘tribal’ groups in the Council’s sphere as a result of the accession of the 
Russian Federation and other states of the CIS.” PATRICK THORNBERRY & MARÍA AMOR MARTÍN 
ESTÉBANEZ, MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 656 (2004).
 60. As was discussed above, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee has regularly 
promoted a dynamic reading of ICCPR Article 27 so that, despite being expressed in 
terms of minority rights, the article has been regularly invoked to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples.
 61. The Advisory Committee produces country-specific opinions adopted following a moni-
toring procedure. This procedure involves the examination of state reports and other
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indigenous people does not exclude persons belonging to that group from 
the protection afforded by the FCNM, since the fact that a group of persons 
may be entitled to a different form of protection cannot by itself justify their 
exclusion from other forms of protection.”62 
As noted in Section II, the early 2000s saw disagreements on particu-
lar provisions of the draft declaration, which mired the discussions at the 
United Nations. Against this background, the Advisory Committee began to 
issue opinions in line with the emergent global regime of indigenous rights, 
providing additional support to the final acceptance and consolidation of 
the regime. In particular, the Advisory Committee promoted a dynamic 
interpretation of Article 5 of the FCNM with a view to extending its ap-
plicability to the specific case of indigenous peoples. Article 5 establishes 
that “the Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons 
belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and 
to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely religion, language, 
traditions and cultural heritage.” Following the practice of the UN Human 
Rights Committee with respect to Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Advisory Com-
mittee regarded the special relationship with their ancestral lands as part of 
the culture of indigenous peoples. Accordingly, it noted on more than one 
occasion that the issue of land rights and the use of territory in general was 
of central relevance to the protection of indigenous cultures and identities.63 
The issue of land rights becomes also relevant in the context of Article 15 
of the FCNM, which states “the Parties shall create the conditions necessary 
for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in 
cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those 
   sources of information as well as meetings on the spot with governmental interlocutors, 
national minority representatives, and other relevant actors. These are then sent to the 
Committee of Ministers, which will issue its recommendations.
 62. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities: Opinion on Finland, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)002, 2000, ¶¶ 21–29; Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: 
Opinion on Norway, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2003)003, 2002, ¶¶ 9, 19; Advisory Committee 
on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Opinion on 
Russia, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2003)005, 2002, ¶ 26; Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Opinion on Sweden, ACFC/INF/
OP/I(2003)006, 2003, ¶ 18.
 63. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minori-
ties: Opinion on Sweden, supra note 62, ¶ 30; Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Second Opinion on Sweden, 
ACFC/OP/II(2007)006, ¶ 68; Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities: Opinion on Finland, supra note 62, ¶ 22; Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
Second Opinion on Finland, ACFC/OP/II(2006)003, ¶ 49; Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Russia, 
supra note 62, ¶ 49; Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Pro-
tection of National Minorities, Second Opinion on the Russian Federation, adopted 11 
May 2006, ACFC/OP/II(2006)004, ¶¶ 96–106.
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affecting them.” Indeed, the Advisory Committee recognized that effective 
participation is of essential importance for indigenous peoples in relation 
to the use and control of their lands.64
A second point should be stressed with regard to the European contribu-
tion. As mentioned above, no specific mechanism or body for the protection 
and promotion of indigenous rights has been created within the European 
human right system. However, it should be noted that the European Union 
(EU) has developed a specific policy with regard to indigenous peoples. 
Despite not being a human rights institution as such, the EU is committed 
to maintain a strong link between its foreign policy and the promotion of 
human rights and democracy, and is therefore worth considering.65 For the 
purpose of this article, it is of special relevance that in 1998 a Council resolu-
tion established the EU guideline principles for engagement with indigenous 
peoples.66 The EU’s approach to indigenous rights is based on the follow-
ing points: first, the recognition and protection of the right of indigenous 
peoples to determine their own social, economic, and cultural development; 
second, the guarantee of their effective participation in projects which may 
affect their livelihood and lands; and third, the recognition of the special 
role played by indigenous peoples in the conservation and sustainability of 
the environment and natural resources.67
These guidelines have been taken into consideration in a number of 
initiatives in the area of human rights. For example, in 2001 the European 
Commission adopted a communication stressing the need to adopt a more 
strategic approach to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
 64. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities, Opinion on Sweden, supra note 62, ¶ 63.
 65. In particular, title V of the EU Treaty (Consolidated Version 2002) refers to the establish-
ment of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). More specifically, 
Article 11 affirms that the objectives of the CFSP shall be: developing and consolidating 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
In addition, Article 177 of the EC Treaty (Article 130u of the EU Treaty) establishes the 
three priority areas for development cooperation of the European Community. These 
are sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries; their 
smooth and gradual integration into the world economy; and the fight against poverty. 
Generally, community policy in this area is also expected to contribute to the general 
objectives of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect-
ing human rights and fundamental freedoms. For an account of the ethical dimension 
of the Foreign Policy of the EU see URFAN KHALIQ, ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A LEGAL APPRAISAL (2008); see also VALUES AND PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN 
UNION FOREIGN POLICY (Sonia Lucarelli & Ian Manners eds., 2006).
 66. Development Council Resolution of 30 Nov. 1998 on Indigenous Peoples within the 
Framework of the Development Cooperation of the Community and the Member States, 
13461/98.
 67. European Commission, Programming Guide for Strategy Papers (Jan. 2006), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/F47_indigenous_peoples_fin_
en.pdf.
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Rights (EIDHR), a program aimed to promote and support human rights 
and democracy worldwide, and included specific references to the case 
of indigenous peoples.68 In particular, the document established that in 
implementing the EIDHR, the European Commission should “ensure the 
promotion of gender equality, of children’s rights and of the rights of indig-
enous peoples, through ‘mainstreaming’ them as cross-cutting issues in all 
projects.”69 Similarly, references to indigenous peoples’ rights were included 
in the 2006 Strategic Paper for the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (Strategic Paper), the regulation that replaced the previous 
EIDHR scheme.70
The traditional leading role of Europe in the protection of human rights 
suggests that special attention should be paid to normative developments 
taking place in the region. Therefore, both the opinions of the Advisory 
Committee of the FCNM and the principles guiding the foreign policy 
of the EU with regard to indigenous peoples should be appreciated. It is 
undoubted that the support of such a key player was crucial in order for 
indigenous peoples’ rights to gain momentum at the global level. After all, 
it should not be forgotten that all EU countries have consistently supported 
initiatives aimed to foster the rights of indigenous peoples within the UN 
human rights machinery.
IV. THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE LEGAL PROCESS OF CLARIFICATION 
AND INTERPRETATION
The previous sections discussed the contribution of regional systems to 
the realization of the global project of recognition of indigenous rights. 
However, as briefly noted in Section I, these influences were not only of a 
political character, for regional systems made also important contributions in 
clarifying a number of crucial legal issues that threatened to undermine the 
effectiveness of the relevant regime. As the following sections will describe, 
the judicial decisions of the IACHR and the pronouncements of the African 
Commission provided vital interpretations of the content of this regime, with 
important consequences with regard to its reception and implementation 
among states.
 68. Communication from the Commission to the Council and The European Parliament 
the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third 
Countries, COM (2001) 252 final (8 May 2001). 
 69. Id. at 29.
 70. Council & Parliament Regulation 1889/2006, Establishing a Financing Instrument for 
the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide, art. 2, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 
(EC).
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A. The Issue of Definition
Contrary to the views expressed by a number of states, the final decision 
was made to omit a definition of indigenous peoples in the text of the 
UNDRIP. As a consequence, the question of “who is indigenous” was left 
partially unanswered.71 Indigenous peoples and other international players 
dealing with indigenous rights maintained that the concept of indigenous 
peoples should apply indiscriminately throughout the world. In contrast, 
strong resistance to accepting the applicability of the concept within their 
territories came from numerous Asian and African countries. As discussed 
in Section II, promoting an inclusive concept of “indigenous peoples” was 
key to the establishment of a truly universal regime of indigenous rights. In 
this regard, the roles played by the African Commission and IACHR have 
been of primary importance.
The position of the African Commission on this issue is reflected in the 
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and Communities re-
ferred to above (Report).72 The Report, adopted by the African Commission 
in 2003, develops a concept of indigenous peoples which is both in line 
with the global normative framework and compatible with the African situ-
ation. Crucially, the Report emphasizes that the term “indigenous” should 
not be intended as “first inhabitant” of a territory exclusively. “Definitely 
all Africans are indigenous,” the Report notes, “however, if the concept 
of indigenous is exclusively linked with a colonial situation, it leaves us 
without a suitable concept for analysing internal structural relationships of 
inequality that have persisted after liberation from colonial dominance.”73 
Thus, the Report concludes that the term “indigenous” should suggest special 
attachment to and use of traditional land, as well as experience of subjuga-
tion, marginalization, and dispossession instead of mere prior occupancy 
of a specific territory.74 In particular, the following characteristics shared by 
certain African communities are highlighted: their cultures and ways of life 
differ considerably from the dominant society; the survival of their particular 
 71. Despite the lack of a definition in the UNDRIP, a number of working definitions have 
been regularly used in UN settings in order to identify indigenous groups. Note on 
Criteria Which Might Be Applied When Considering the Concept of Indigenous Peoples 
by Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prev. of 
Discrim. & Protect. Of Min., Working Grp. on Indigeous Populations, 13th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1995/3 (1995); Working Paper on the Concept of “Indigenous 
People,” by Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, supra note 26.
 72. REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS/COM-
MUNITIES, supra note 51.
 73. Id. at 92.
 74. Id. Acknowledging the complications that could emerge as a consequence of its find-
ings, however, the WGIPC also specifies that the term indigenous peoples should not 
be “misused as a chauvinistic term with the aim of achieving rights and positions over 
and above other ethnic groups or members of the national community.” Id. at 102.
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way of life depends on access and rights to their traditional land and the 
natural resources thereon; they suffer from discrimination as they are being 
regarded as less developed and less advanced than other more dominant 
sectors of society; they often live in inaccessible regions and suffer from 
various forms of marginalization, both politically and socially; they are sub-
ject to domination and exploitation within national political and economic 
structures that are commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities 
of the national majority.75 Because of these characteristics, the Report goes 
on, these peoples are prevented from “being able to genuinely participate 
in deciding on their own future and forms of development,” with the con-
sequence that their cultures and ways of life are put at risk.76 
Importantly, the IACHR has supported the approach of the African 
Commission, taking the view that being “indigenous” does not necessarily 
imply being the “first inhabitant” of a certain land. In two recent cases the 
IACHR extended its existing jurisprudence on indigenous rights to some 
Afro-indigenous communities living in Suriname despite the fact that they 
are descendants of African slaves who were resettled in Suriname only in 
the eighteenth century in context of the slave trade.77 The Court found that 
these groups are nevertheless entitled to special protection of their communal 
property rights by virtue of their culture, special relationship with their land, 
and long connection with the region.78 
In sum, the African Commission and IACHR made important contribu-
tions in clarifying the meaning of the expression “indigenous peoples” in 
international law. In particular, they provided legal recognition to a modern 
concept of “indigenous peoples,” notably one that has evolved from a nar-
row understanding bound to ideas of historical precedence and colonial 
subjugation towards a more inclusive and functional understanding. Given 
the traditional resistance to accepting the concept of indigenous peoples in 
Africa, the Report endorsed by the African Commission was of paramount 
value. Furthermore, considering that those Asian states, which sought to 
oppose the applicability of indigenous rights in their territories, relied on 
the same narrow understanding of the concept of “indigenous peoples.” 
It is clear that the African Commission’s dynamic approach had important 
global implications.
 75. Id. at 89, 90.
 76. Id. 
 77. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (15 June 2005); 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (28 Nov. 2007). For 
a broad discussion of the theme see Gerald Torres, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Indigenous 
Peoples and Reparations, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 117 (Federico Lenzerini ed., 2008).
 78. Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 84, 96.
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B. The Right to Self-Determination
Article 3 of the UNDRIP establishes that “indigenous peoples have the right 
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their po-
litical status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment.” During the negotiations on the draft declaration, a number of states 
proposed alternative versions of the article with a view to emphasizing the 
internal aspect of this right, and, contextually, ruling out the possibility that 
indigenous self-determination would include a right to independence.79 
Ultimately, none of these proposals were accepted. 
When the draft declaration reached the UN General Assembly in No-
vember 2007, the African Group of States introduced a resolution to defer 
the adoption of the text.80 The essence of the African states’ reservations 
was captured by a subsequent decision of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the African Union Assembly.81 Welcoming the decision 
to not adopt the declaration in its then form, the Assembly highlighted a 
number of “matters of fundamental political and constitutional concern” that 
demanded additional consideration on the part of African states. Primary 
among those concerns were the right to self-determination and the principle 
of national and territorial integrity.82 In particular, the Assembly expressed 
its concern about “the political, economic, social and constitutional impli-
cations,” that the Declaration, and in particular self-determination, could 
have on the African continent.83 In addition, it made an explicit reference to 
the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples,84 an occurrence indicating the conservative 
approach to self-determination taken by the Assembly. If self-determination, 
as suggested by the abovementioned General Assembly Declaration, was 
 79. Among others, the representative of Venezuela proposed the following wording: “In-
digenous peoples have a right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they have 
the right to autonomy, or self-government in matter relating to their internal and local 
affairs,” Report of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n 
on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., ¶ 318, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/102 (1996).
 80. Namibia: Amendments to Draft Resolution A/C.3/61/L.18/Rev.1, U.N. GAOR, Third 
Comm., 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev.1 (2006) (introduced by Namibia on 
behalf of the African Group of States). The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly 
adopted the resolution by a vote of 82 in favor and 67 against (with 25 abstentions).
 81. Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 30. 
 82. Id. ¶ 6. The other matters of concern were: the definition of indigenous peoples; 
ownership of land and resources; and establishment of distinct political and economic 
institutions.
 83. Id. ¶ 3.
 84. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted 
14 Dec. 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 
(1961).
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intended as including a right to independence, it should be expected that 
states would strenuously oppose it. Indeed, the Decision of the AU Assembly 
also recalled a 1964 resolution of the Organization of African Unity, in which 
all member states pledged “to respect borders existing on their achievement 
of national independence.”85 From this, it is evident that the majority of 
African states regarded the recognition of the right to self-determination to 
indigenous peoples, in the form endorsed by the then text of the declaration, 
as being incompatible with the principle of territorial integrity. 
Against this background, the African Commission took the lead issuing 
an Advisory Opinion on the UN draft declaration in the attempt to clarify 
the contents and implications of the most critical provisions of the text.86 
In this opinion, the African Commission noted that the concept of self-
determination has evolved since the time of decolonization, and that at 
present it is compatible with the unity and territorial integrity of states.87 In 
dismissing the perceived problem arising from the issue of territorial integrity, 
the African Commission also emphasized that the protection of indigenous 
rights was to be interpreted: 
[W]ithin the context of a strict respect for the inviolability of borders and of 
the obligation to preserve the territorial integrity of State Parties, in conformity 
with the principles and values enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the UN Charter.88 
Following the circulation of this opinion, the African Group of States pro-
posed an amended version of the text and began negotiations with states and 
indigenous delegates with a view to agreeing upon a final text to be adopted 
by the UN General Assembly. As requested by the African Commission, the 
provision on the right to self-determination, namely Article 3, was not an 
object of discussion and was maintained in its original form, as adamantly 
demanded by indigenous peoples. In contrast, a number of safeguards were 
included in other parts of the UNDRIP.89 Thanks to the agreement reached 
by the African states and indigenous peoples the text was adopted by a vast 
majority of votes.
 85. Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 30, ¶ 2. 
 86. Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted May 2007, 
Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & People’s Rts., 41st Ord. Sess., available at http://www.achpr.
org/english/Special%20Mechanisms/Indegenous/Advisory%20opinion_eng.pdf. 
 87. Id. ¶ 27.
 88. Id. ¶ 6.
 89. “[N]othing in this Declaration may be . . . construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States.” Id. art. 46.
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C. Land Rights
The last controversial issue to be considered is that of land rights. As dis-
cussed in Section II, during the negotiations on the UN draft declaration 
a number of states opposed the recognition of such rights, especially the 
right to restitution, pointing out that the land rights regime envisaged in the 
document was unworkable and could not be implemented. Notwithstanding 
these objections, the final version of the UNDRIP included several strong 
provisions on land rights such as Article 26, on the right of indigenous 
peoples to own and control their lands, territories, and resources, and Article 
28, on the right to redress, including restitution, for the lands that were lost 
without their free, prior, and informed consent. In light of the centrality of 
these rights, it was important to clarify the actual content of the regime and 
prove that it could work in practice. 
Against this background, the IACHR developed a significant jurispru-
dence on the issue of indigenous land rights, departing from Article 21 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) on the 
right to property.90 The IACHR promoted an extensive interpretation of this 
provision taking into account the most recent international normative de-
velopments in the sphere of indigenous peoples’ rights.91 It established that 
Article 21 also protects the right of the members of indigenous groups to 
collectively own their ancestral lands. This groundbreaking interpretation, 
introduced for the first time in the 2001 case, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua,92 and later confirmed in a number of equally 
significant cases,93 stems from the preliminary recognition of the special 
relationship between indigenous peoples and their land. On this basis, 
the IACHR held that members of those groups who are characterized by a 
traditional collective form of organization, a spiritual relationship with their 
ancestor lands, and a communal system of ownership of the said lands, are 
 90. Article 21 of the Convention reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such 
use and enjoyment to the interest of society; (2) No one shall be deprived of his property except 
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases 
and according to the forms established by law; (3) Usury and any other form of exploitation of 
man by man shall be prohibited by law. 
   American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, art. 21, O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered 
into force 18 July 1978).
 91. Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System, supra note 24.
 92. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (31 
Aug. 2001).
 93. Comunidad Indigena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 
124, 137 (17 June 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 118–21 (29 Mar. 2006); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 87–96 (28 Nov. 2007). 
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entitled to the protection provided by Article 21.94 Importantly, the IACHR 
also established that the protection of indigenous land rights accorded under 
Article 21 of the American Convention must be read in combination with 
a contextual right to restitution. Initially, it observed that “the members of 
indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost 
possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack 
legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in 
good faith.”95 In addition, the IACHR stressed that under the latter circum-
stance, indigenous peoples are not left without protection altogether. Despite 
lacking property rights, it noted, indigenous peoples have a right to restitution 
with regard to those lands. As noted above, a number of states maintained 
that establishing such a right would unjustly discriminate against third par-
ties and would ultimately make the system unworkable. In this context, the 
IACHR’s approach to this issue becomes of special value.
As a premise, the IACHR noted that Article 21 of the American Con-
vention protects communal properties of indigenous communities as much 
as private properties of individuals.96 It follows that competing claims of 
indigenous peoples and individuals need to be balanced and assessed on 
an ad hoc basis. The general rule upheld by the IACHR is that restrictions to 
the right to property, whether they affect indigenous peoples or individuals, 
must meet a number of specific requirements: first, they must be established 
by law; second, they must be necessary and proportional; and third, they 
must be aimed towards attaining a legitimate goal in a democratic society.97 
Thus, not every restriction to the enjoyment and exercise of the right to prop-
erty is permissible.98 This said, in case of clashes between private property 
and claims for ancestral property, the IACHR emphasized that “states must 
 94. In the words of the IACHR:
[A]mong indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of col-
lective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not centered on an individual 
but rather on the group and its community. Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, 
have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land 
must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, 
their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are 
not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they 
must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.
   Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149.
 95. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., supra note 93, ¶ 128.
 96. Comunidad Indigena Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 143.
 97. Id. ¶ 144.
 98. Accordingly, the IACHR held that “the necessity of legally established restrictions will 
depend on whether they are geared toward satisfying an imperative public interest.” 
Therefore, it would be insufficient “to prove, for example, that the law fulfils a useful or 
timely purpose.” Furthermore, the Court explained that the criterion of proportionality is 
“based on the restriction being closely adjusted to the attainment of a legitimate objec-
tive, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the restricted right.” 
Finally, the IACHR stated that “for the restrictions to be compatible with the Convention,
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take into account that indigenous territorial rights encompass a broader 
and different concept that relates to the collective right to survival as an 
organized people, with control over their habitat as a necessary condition 
for reproduction of their culture, for their own development and to carry 
out their life aspirations.”99 It follows, the IACHR continued, that “disregard-
ing the ancestral right of the members of the indigenous communities to 
their territories could affect other basic rights, such as the right to cultural 
identity and to the very survival of the indigenous communities and their 
members.”100 At the same time, the IACHR observed that “restriction of the 
right of private individuals to private property might be necessary to attain 
the collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a democratic and 
pluralist society, in the sense given to this by the American Convention; 
and it could be proportional, if fair compensation is paid to those affected 
pursuant to Article 21(2) of the Convention.”101 
This apparent predisposition for deciding in favor of indigenous peoples, 
however, is counterbalanced by two important elements. First, the IACHR 
introduced a time restriction on the exercise of the group’s property rights. 
More specifically, it found that the right is enforceable as long as the spe-
cial relationship between an indigenous community and its land continue 
to exist.102 According to the IACHR, this “relationship may be expressed in 
different ways, depending on the particular indigenous people involved and 
the specific circumstances surrounding it, and it may include the traditional 
use or presence, be it through spiritual or ceremonial ties; settlements or 
sporadic cultivation; seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting, and fishing; 
the use of natural resources associated with their customs and any other 
element characterizing their culture.”103 Second, the IACHR made clear 
that recognizing the right of restitution in one specific case does not imply 
“that every time there is a conflict between the territorial interests of private 
individuals or of the State and those of the members of the indigenous com-
munities, the latter must prevail over the former.”104
The IACHR has also addressed the critical issue of natural resources 
found on and within indigenous peoples’ lands. In affirming that Article 21 
of the American Convention recognizes and protects these resources, the 
IACHR noted that this article “should not be interpreted in a way that pre-
   they must be justified by collective objectives that, because of their importance, clearly 
prevail over the necessity of full enjoyment of the restricted right.” This is in line with 
the general prescription of Article 21(1) according to which the law may subordinate 
the use and enjoyment of property to the interest of society. Id. ¶ 145.
 99. Id. ¶ 146.
100. Id. ¶ 147.
101. Id. ¶ 148.
102. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty, supra note 93, ¶131.
103. Id.
104. Comunidad Indigena Yakye Axa, supra note 93, ¶ 149.
Vol. 32978 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
vents the state from granting any type of concession for the exploration and 
extraction of natural recourses,” within a territory owned by an indigenous 
community.105 Thus, under certain conditions, states may legitimately restrict 
the rights of indigenous peoples to own and control these resources.106 
Following the same principles elaborated in the context of land rights, the 
Court found that restrictions are possible only if they are established by law, 
are necessary and proportional, and have the aim of achieving a legitimate 
objective in a democratic society. However, the IACHR listed four additional 
obligations that states must respect in order to safeguard the special rela-
tionship between indigenous peoples and their territories, and, in turn, their 
very existence: first, to ensure the effective participation of the members of 
the community in any development or investment, plan; second, to ensure 
that the concerned people have a reasonable share of the benefits; third, to 
perform or supervise prior environmental and social impact assessments; and 
fourth, to implement adequate safeguards and mechanism so as to avoid that 
the concerned activities significantly affect the conditions of the traditional 
lands and natural resources at stake.107
In sum, the IACHR elaborated a coherent and workable system of 
adjudication with regard to indigenous peoples’ land rights, including a 
right to restitution and rights over natural resources. Crucially, the IACHR’s 
balanced analysis of competing claims showed that land rights can be rec-
ognized within existing domestic constitutional frameworks without neces-
sary prejudice to states’ or third parties’ interests. By doing so, the IACHR 
contributed significantly to elucidating the regime of land rights included 
in the UNDRIP.108 
V. CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of indigenous rights represents a remarkable novelty in the 
field of international human rights. The recognition of critical rights to in-
105. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 126 (28 Nov. 
2007). 
106. The IACHR specified that the resources to be protected are those “necessary for the very 
survival, development and continuation of [indigenous peoples’] way of life.” However, 
activities related to resources that are not necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples 
will nevertheless fall within the scope of Article 21 if they have important repercussions 
on resources that are necessary for the survival of these peoples. Saramaka People, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 103.
107. Id. ¶ 126.
108. It should be noted that a recent decision of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights concerning, among others, the land rights of an indigenous community 
living in Kenya fully endorsed the jurisprudence of the IACHR. See Centre for Minority 
Rights Development (Kenya) v. Kenya, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., 276/2003 (4 
Feb. 2010), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/Endorois_Decision.pdf.
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digenous peoples, such as the right to self-determination and to collectively 
own their traditional lands, not only significantly differentiates the regime 
of indigenous rights from that of national minorities, but also, and crucially, 
challenges traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and the conventional 
Western view that human rights are individual in character. The implications 
stemming from these innovations should, therefore, be carefully considered 
and evaluated. At the same time, the process that led to the emergence of 
these sui generis rights should be aptly analyzed. Among the distinguishing 
features that characterized this process, the interplay between the interna-
tional and regional layers is of special interest. It is widely recognized that 
regional human rights systems can play a crucial role in strengthening the 
effectiveness of universal human rights. There is little doubt that this will 
also hold true with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights. However, regional 
bodies can also play a significant role in the very process of the construc-
tion and consolidation of an emerging international regime. In the case 
of indigenous peoples’ rights, the parallel legal and quasi-legal processes 
taking place within the context of the Inter-American, African, and Euro-
pean regional systems importantly supported and strengthened the global 
political process of recognition of indigenous rights. On another level, they 
have also contributed to the legal process of clarification and interpretation 
of a number of critical provisions of the regime, facilitating its reception 
and implementation among states. In doing so, regional bodies have suc-
cessfully combined instruments of varied content and legal effects such as 
declarations, opinions, comments, and judicial decisions. Obviously, each 
regional player contributed in a singular way and to a different degree. 
Nevertheless, the combined effect of the concerned actions had an impor-
tant impact on the global level. This impact proves that in the context of 
a more dynamic international legal system where the interaction between 
hard and soft law gradually becomes more valuable, and where non-state 
actors are permitted a more significant role in the process of international 
law-making, the increasing number of political and legal initiatives taking 
place at the regional level can have an important effect on the emergence 
of new global human rights regimes.
